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Interpretation Training Influences Memory for Prior Interpretations
Elske Salemink
University of Amsterdam
Paula Hertel
Trinity University
Bundy Mackintosh
University of East Anglia
Anxiety is associated with memory biases when the initial interpretation of the event is taken into
account. This experiment examined whether modification of interpretive bias retroactively affects
memory for prior events and their initial interpretation. Before training, participants imagined themselves
in emotionally ambiguous scenarios to which they provided endings that often revealed their interpre-
tations. Then they were trained to resolve the ambiguity in other situations in a consistently positive (n
37) or negative way (n 38) before they tried to recall the initial scenarios and endings. Results indicated
that memory for the endings was imbued with the emotional tone of the training, whereas memory for
the scenarios was unaffected.
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Although anxious individuals are disproportionately fast in de-
tecting threatening stimuli and tend to interpret ambiguous events
in a threatening manner (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994), evidence
regarding anxiety-related memory biases is rare (MacLeod &
Mathews, 2004). Recently, experiments by Hertel, Brozovich,
Joormann, and Gotlib (2008) revealed memory biases in social
anxiety by viewing them through the lens of interpretation biases.
Individuals with generalized social phobia and controls first inter-
preted ambiguous yet potentially threatening social scenarios by
formulating an ending to each one. Later they were asked to recall
the scenarios and their endings. Compared to controls, socially
anxious participants interpreted the scenarios more negatively, and
their subsequent recall attempts reflected the meaning of those
negative interpretations.
In a related, but initially separate development, the study of
interpretation bias has taken a different direction as researchers
have sought to establish causal connections between cognitive and
emotional aspects of anxiety. By guiding the direction of resolving
ambiguity, it is possible to modify bias and then examine the
effects of this modification in subsequent tasks. These procedures
are generally termed cognitive bias modification of interpretation
(CBM-I), and they have successfully simulated findings of inter-
pretation biases in anxious populations (Mackintosh, Mathews,
Yiend, Ridgeway, & Cook, 2006; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000;
Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2007; Yiend, Mackintosh, &
Mathews, 2005). As might be expected, there have even been a
few successful attempts to apply this CBM-I technique to the study
of memory biases (Hertel, 2004; Tran, Hertel, & Joormann, 2010).
These experiments trained participants to interpret ambiguity in a
benign or negative way and examined transfer to memory pro-
cesses. Results revealed that people can be trained, whether by
idiosyncratic experience or experimentally, to remember subse-
quently encountered events in emotionally slanted ways. In this
sense, both Hertel and Tran et al. trained proactive biases in
memory.
In the present study, we examined whether trained interpretation
bias also influences memory for ambiguous events in a retroactive
fashion. When people become anxious, do they reflect back on
preanxiety experiences and recall them in ways that are biased by
their current state? Based on the method of revealing memory
biases used by Hertel et al. (2008) the experiment consisted of
three phases. In the first phase, participants listened to descriptions
of 16 ambiguous social scenarios, each time providing their own
endings. In the second phase, interpretative style was modified
with Mathews and Mackintosh’s (2000) interpretation bias training
for 104 scenarios, irrelevant to those in Phase 1. The third phase
consisted of the memory tests (as well as a subsequent check for
interpretation bias). With this design we aimed to simulate real-
world situations in which memory for prior events is changed as a
consequence of developing an anxiety disorder. In a manner anal-
ogous to effects of misleading information on memory for previ-
ous reactions (Hertel, 1982), we predicted that participants who
were trained to make negative interpretations would recall their
previous interpretations as more negative than would participants
trained to make more benign or positive interpretations. The pre-
diction regarding memory for the scenarios themselves was less
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clear. Tran et al. (2010) found that CBM-I conducted prior to the
to-be-remembered scenarios caused emotionally consistent intru-
sions in recall. Yet, the results of Experiment 2 by Hertel et al.
(2008) suggested that such intrusions arose from imagery pro-
cesses operating during initial interpretations (see Hirsch, Clark, &
Mathews, 2006). From the latter perspective, our training proce-
dures should not affect recall of scenarios encountered earlier.
Methods
Design
The experiment involved three main phases: encountering the
to-be-remembered scenarios (TBRS), experiencing CBM-I, and
responding to the memory and interpretation bias tests. Because
CBM-I is associated with change in anxiety (Mathews & Mack-
intosh, 2000), a 3-min filler task was inserted between the training
and subsequent testing to allow anxiety to return to baseline. State
anxiety (STAI, Van der Ploeg, Defares, & Spielberger, 2000) was
measured before CBM-I and after the filler task. Figure 1 illus-
trates the procedure.
Participants
Students (56 female and 19 male) participated for course credit
or 10 Euros. They were randomly allocated to either positive
CBM-I (n  37) or negative CBM-I (n  38). At the outset, the
groups did not differ significantly in state anxiety, p .82 (Mpos
35.8, Mneg  36.1).
Materials
Phase 1. The TBRS consisted of eight ambiguous social and
eight nonsocial (filler) scenarios, translations of those used by
Hertel et al. (2008, Experiment 2). An example follows:
You are with a group of new friends at a local pub.
You start to tell a joke you heard recently, and everyone looks
at you.
Their expressions change when you get to the punch line.
Phase 2. CBM-I scenarios were based on those used by
Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) and revised to reflect student
situations (Salemink et al., 2007; Salemink, van den Hout, &
Kindt, 2009). Each of eight blocks contained eight initially am-
biguous modification scenarios, three nonemotional and nonam-
biguous filler scenarios, one positive probe, and one negative
probe. In each modification scenario, the final sentence contained
a word fragment that disambiguated meaning in a consistently
positive or negative direction according to condition. The two
probes in each block were similar to the modification scenarios but
ended in a fragmented word with fixed positive or negative va-
lence, irrespective of CBM-I condition.
Phase 3. A booklet of 10 additional ambiguous scenarios—
one per page—described student-related social situations. Again,
the scenario endings contained word fragments, however this time
the meaning remained ambiguous. In a second booklet, the title of
each scenario was presented together with four versions of the
original final sentence. The set included a possible positive inter-
pretation, a possible negative interpretation, a positive foil sen-
tence, and a negative foil sentence. The order within the set was
randomized for each title and fixed across participants. (For ex-
amples see Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000).
Procedure
The session purportedly contained two separate experiments
that focused on attention and concentration. To increase the dis-
tinction between phases, we presented each TBRS in Phase 1
aurally via headphones while showing the title against a blue
background on the monitor. Participants were asked to imagine
themselves as the central character and to generate at least one
additional sentence. These endings were said aloud into a micro-
phone and recorded. The experimenter remained in the room
during three practice trials. Then the 16 TBRS were presented in
a fixed random order.
Phase 2 was disguised as a separate experiment; participants
filled out the STAI/state before three practice trials and eight
blocks of CBM-I. All scenarios were presented visually in black
font on a white background. Participants viewed each text, line by
line, at a rate that was self-paced by spacebar press. In the final
sentence a space for the missing word was filled by its fragment
upon another press. Participants completed the fragment and con-
sequently disambiguated the emotional meaning of the scenario.
Then a comprehension question appeared; participants pressed Y
for yes and N for no, and received feedback (correct vs. wrong
answer). Following CBM-I, we administered exercises from the
Wechsler Vocabulary subtests (Wechsler, 1981) for 3 min and a
second STAI/state.
In Phase 3, participants were surprised by a request to remember
the initial scenarios and the endings they invented. To cue recall,
each title was again displayed against a blue background, with the
first sentence simultaneously presented over headphones. Partici-
pants attempted to recall aloud the remaining two sentences. Then,
after pressing the space bar, they were visually prompted to recall
 
 
 
 
Phase 1                       Phase 2                            Phase 3       
To-be-remembered 
scenarios 
Positive CBM-I 
Negative CBM-I 
Break 
Memory  
test 
 2 etats IATS  1 etats IATS Interpretation 
bias test 
Figure 1. Overview of the experimental design and procedure.
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their own ending. The memory test was followed by the interpre-
tation test. In the first booklet participants completed the word
fragment to end each scenario. In the second booklet they rated
each sentence for its similarity in meaning to the original scenario
by using a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (very different in meaning)
to 4 (very similar in meaning).
Coding and scoring procedures. Two raters, blind to CBM-I
allocation, coded the audio recordings from the first and third
phase. Endings from Phases 1 and 3 were coded as negative (1),
neutral (0), or positive (1);  averaged across scenarios was .83 in
Phase 1 and .79 in Phase 3. We also scored the number of social
TBRS that contained intrusions (0–8) and the valence of those
intrusions (averaged across the eight social scenarios). A recalled
scenario was scored as containing an intrusion if there were any
terms that had not been presented originally (average   .70).
Raters coded intrusion valence as belonging to one of the three
categories (average   .81). Averaged valence scores ranged
from 1 to  1.
Results
The emotional valence of initial and remembered endings, to-
gether with the nature of intrusions in scenario recall, constitute the
main categories of dependent measures. These outcomes are de-
scribed first and followed by reports of evidence for training
effects. For all analyses, the significance level was set at .05.
Memory for Initial Interpretations
We evaluated the effects of CBM-I on memory for the emo-
tional quality of the participant-supplied endings in Phase 1 by
using a Group-by-Phase mixed-design ANOVA.1
There was a significant main effect of group, F(1, 67)  7.58,
p  .01, p2  .10, indicating that overall positively trained
participants produced more positive interpretations than negatively
trained participants. However, this effect was qualified by a
significant Group  Phase interaction F(1, 67)  7.89, p  .01,
p
2  .11. The finding that the change in valence across phases
depended upon training is shown in Figure 2. Although the groups’
valence scores did not differ before training, t(67)  1.4, p  .17
(Mpos  0.15, SD  0.21; Mneg  0.07, SD  0.24), they differed
significantly afterward, t(67)  3.33, p  .001. Positively trained
participants remembered their endings as having been more posi-
tive (M  0.25, SD  0.29), compared to those in the negative
group (M  0.02, SD  0.28). Thus, interpretation training influ-
enced memory for prior interpretations of ambiguous scenarios.
Intrusions in Scenario Recall
An independent samples t test revealed that the groups did not
differ significantly in the overall number of intrusions in scenario
recall, t(71)  0.67 (Mpos  3.3, SD  1.6; Mneg  3.0, SD 
1.3).2 Moreover, CBM-I failed to affect the valence of the intru-
sions, t(69)  0.7 (Mpos  0.06, SD  0.26; Mneg  0.01, SD 
0.36). Memory for the emotional qualities of the initial scenarios
therefore was unaffected by training.
Modification of Interpretation Bias
Probe latencies. Data were set aside if the response to the
fragment or the corresponding comprehension question was incor-
rect (4.0%), or if the latency was less than 200 ms (0.3%) or
greater than three SDs above the overall mean (2.4%). A mixed-
design ANOVA included group as the between-subjects factor and
probe valence (positive vs. negative) as the within-subject factor.
There was a significant main effect of probe type, F(1, 73) 4.63,
p .05, p2 .06 with faster responses to positive than to negative
probes. In addition, the predicted Group  Valence interaction
was confirmed, F(1, 73)  11.73, p  .001, p2  .14. Although
negative training did not differentiate latencies according to va-
lence, t(37)  0.84 (Mpos  1270 ms, SD  452 vs. Mneg  1236
ms, SD  403), positive training did, t(36)  4.29, p  .001
(Mpos  1368 ms, SD  376; Mneg  1516 ms, SD  422).
Independent t tests revealed a significant group difference in
responding to negative probes only, t(73)  2.93, p  .01.
Positive training slowed responses to negative word fragments.
Similarity rating test. As a second manipulation check, a
mixed-design ANOVA was performed on the similarity ratings in
Booklet 2, with group as the between-subjects factor and valence
and target (possible interpretation vs. foil sentence) as within-
subject factors. Analysis revealed significant main effects of va-
lence, F(1, 71)  8.22, p  .01, p2  .10, and target, F(1, 71) 
614.72, p  .001, p2  .90, reflecting respectively greater en-
dorsement of positive and possible interpretations. The significant
Group  Valence interaction, F(1, 71)  64.44, p  .001, p2 
.48, was qualified by the 3-way interaction, F(1, 71)  28.72, p 
.001, p2  .29 (see Figure 3).3 The simple interaction of Group 
Valence was more extreme for possible interpretations, F(1, 71)
54.53, p  .001, p2  .43, than for foils, F(1, 71)  35.91, p 
.001, p2  .34. Regarding possible interpretations, positively
trained participants interpreted new ambiguous information in a
more positive than negative way, t(36)  9.05, p  .001, while
negatively trained participants interpreted the information to be
more negative than positive, t(35)  2.94, p  .01. In short,
participants interpreted new ambiguous information in a manner
consistent with their training, confirming the effectiveness of the
CBM-I.
State Anxiety
To inspect whether the groups were comparable regarding state
anxiety, a 2  2 mixed-design ANOVA was performed on the
state anxiety data with group (positive vs. negative CBM-I) as the
between-subjects factor and time (pre-CBM-I vs. post-CBM-I
following the filler task). No significant effects were found (small-
est p  .18), including the Group  Time interaction effect, F(1,
73)  1.18, p  .28, p2  .02. The overall average was 35.4
(SD  6.1).
1 We lost data from one participant due to a faulty recording; five
participants forgot five or six of their own endings, and their data were
omitted from the analysis.
2 One participant failed to remember six of the eight scenarios, so these
data were excluded. Because two participants made no intrusions at all,
their data did not contribute to the analysis regarding the valence of
intrusions, presented next.
3 The data from two participants were omitted, because they did not
understand the task.
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Discussion
Our aim was to examine whether interpretation bias retroac-
tively interferes with memory for the emotional quality of earlier
reactions to social situations and with memory for the actual
details. The modification of interpretations successfully replicated
earlier CBM-I findings. Positively trained students interpreted new
ambiguous scenarios (in Phase 3) as more positive than negative
and the reverse characterized negative training. It is important that
the positively trained students remembered their previous reactions
as having been more positive. It is unlikely that this difference is
due to mood effects, because the groups were comparable in state
anxiety. However, influences from undetected differences in neg-
ative mood cannot be ruled out. Finally, as anticipated on the basis
of prior evidence concerning the basis of memory errors in social
anxiety (Hertel et al., 2008), interpretation training did not affect
the nature of intrusions in recall of scenario details.
The idea that memory for prior reactions might be influenced by
subsequently established interpretative bias is somewhat analo-
gous to the effects of misleading information (Hertel, 1982).
Johnson and Raye’s (1981) reality monitoring framework provides
one way to understand these errors. As participants recalled the
ambiguous scenarios in the first part of each memory trial, they
likely generated an interpretation that was informed by training
and available during the second part of the trial to compete with
any memory of their initial interpretation. The reality-monitoring
perspective holds that confusions are likely when the sources of
generation are similar. In this case, both the to-be-remembered
ending and the proposed new interpretation would both be inter-
nally generated, and the more recent interpretation might often win
the race. A slightly different possibility is that a frame of mind
resulting from training might make it difficult to retrieve incon-
sistent continuations and therefore the “remembered” ending
would be constructed anew. In this case, the mechanism would be
replacement and not competition. Choice among these possibilities
awaits further research. At this point, however, it is interesting to
note that similar issues apply to other types of CBM-I effects. For
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example, Hoppitt, Mathews, Yiend, and Mackintosh (2010) pro-
vided evidence that interpretation training can sometimes “prime”
semantic categories, instead of changing specific interpretations.
Our lack of evidence for training effects on memory for the
scenarios is consistent with evidence that memory intrusions arise
from interpretive processes operating during initial exposure (Her-
tel et al., 2008; Hirsch et al., 2006). Similarly, Kindt, Soeter, and
Vervliet (2009) found that propranolol delivery before the reacti-
vation of a fear memory did not affect the declarative memory for
the acquired contingency between a conditioned and uncondi-
tioned stimulus, however it did result in changes in the emotional
response. This correspondence across different paradigms suggests
that emotional responses to recently formed memories can be
modified, while leaving other aspects of the experience intact. In
real-world situations, however, perceptions and interpretations
might not be so easily differentiated. Moreover, our coding scheme
might have been insufficiently sensitive to detect more subtle
interpretation-based intrusions. In short, a firm conclusion about
retrospective influences of CBM-I on memory for scenarios awaits
results of future research.
A possible limitation in our procedure concerns the large num-
ber of intervening scenarios (in CBM-I) between initial exposure
and the memory test, which might make it difficult to remember
the initial scenarios. However, we set the TBRS apart from the
training scenarios by presenting them in a different modality
(auditory vs. visual), context (main experiment vs. filler experi-
ment from colleague), and with different themes (generally social
vs. specific student related situations), and background (blue vs.
white). Ultimately, the percentage of recall attempts that contained
intrusions was quite similar to the percentage found by Hertel et al.
(2008), who of course did not employ training scenarios (M 
40% vs. 45%, respectively). A second possible limitation was the
short delay between initial exposure and test. In this respect, the
training scenarios seem to simulate social experiences stretched
out over time. However, future studies should delay the test in the
interest of extending the results to the modification of maladaptive
memories.
In sum, we demonstrated that modifying interpretations follow-
ing exposure to ambiguous information affects the later recall of
initial interpretations. These results illustrate the relationship
among different biases in information processing and the fact that
cognitive biases influence each other (see also Hirsch et al., 2006).
Furthermore, the change in memory for ones initial interpretation
is related to elements from cognitive restructuring interventions in
cognitive behavior therapy. To modify anxiety and behavior, so-
cially anxious patients are encouraged to critically question the
accuracy of their negative thoughts (i.e., negative interpretations)
about past events and to change those interpretations into a more
realistic and less negative direction (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg,
1985). A clinical application of CBM-I, besides having beneficial
effects on patients’ current interpretations, potentially would be
capable of affecting memory for past dysfunctional interpretations
or dysfunctional memory of past interpretations.
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